UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES
STUDY INFORMATION SHEET

Professors Alexander Streitzier (PhD) and Rebecca Stone (PhD), from the School of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) are conducting a survey.
You were selected as a possible participant because you are subscribed to Amazon Mechanical Turk as an MTurk Worker. Your participation is voluntary.

Why is this survey being done?
We are conducting this survey in order to investigate how people make decisions.

What will happen if I participate?
If you volunteer to participate, the researcher will ask you to do the following:
• Read a case study and make decisions based on the given situation
• Provide demographical data

How long will the survey take?
The survey will take a total of about 10 to 15 minutes.

Are there any potential risks or discomforts that I can expect from participating?
There are no anticipated risks or discomfort.

Are there any potential benefits if I participate?
You will not directly benefit from your participation.

The results of the research may improve our general understanding of which factors are important when people make decisions in their everyday life.

What other choices do I have if I choose not to participate?
You are free to choose any other HIT (Human Intelligence Task) on Amazon Mechanical Turk or refrain from any participation on any task.

Will I be paid for participating?
You will receive $1.50 for completing the survey. The payment will be transferred to your account a few days after you complete it.

Will information about me and my participation be kept confidential?
Any information that is obtained in connection with this survey that can identify you will remain confidential. It will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality will be maintained by means of limiting the access to the data only to the investigators, using it only for research purposes and collecting only information that does not allow anyone to draw conclusions about your identity.

What are my rights if I participate?
You can choose whether or not you want to participate, and you may withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any time. Whatever decision you make, there will be no penalty to you, and no loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may refuse to answer any questions that you do not want to answer.

Who can I contact if I have questions about this study?
The research team:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the researchers. Please contact:

Alexander Streitzier; alexander.streitzier@law.ucla.edu; phone: +1 (310) 207-4263

UCLA Office of the Human Research Protection Program (OHRRP):
If you have questions about your rights while taking part in this survey, or if you have concerns or suggestions, and you want to talk to someone other than the researchers, please call the OHRRP at (310) 825-7102 or write to:

UCLA Office of the Human Research Protection Program
11020 Waples Avenue, Suite 211, Box 951584
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594

☑ I have read and agree to the terms and conditions

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Thank you for participating in this survey. The purpose of this survey is to study how people make decisions in certain situations. You will earn $1.50 for completing the survey. The survey will take approximately 10-15 minutes.
Imagine you witness the following:

Two people, A and B, have an opportunity to cooperate with each other.

B must first choose between two alternatives (see diagram above): going it alone, or joining forces with A.

The upside of joining forces with A is that the combined monetary payoff of the two parties is much higher than if B were to go it alone.

The downside is that by joining forces with A, B puts himself at the mercy of A. This is because once B has decided to join forces with A, A can unilaterally decide not to cooperate with B in which case A gets all the profit from the venture. In other words, if B thinks that A is not going to cooperate, B is better off going it alone. However, that would leave both A and B worse off than if B had joined forces with A and A had cooperated.

If B decides to join forces with A, then, before A makes the decision whether to cooperate or not, B may invest in their cooperative venture. B's investment is lost if A does not cooperate. The higher B's level of investment, the higher will be B's loss (see right payoff table). However, if A cooperates with B, B's profits initially increase with his investment but then decrease once his investment rises beyond a certain point (see left payoff table).
Preliminary Questions

1) What are the parties' profits when A cooperates and B has invested 3?

Profit of A: 
Profit of B: 

2) What are the parties' profits when A doesn't cooperate and B has invested 3?

Profit of A: 
Profit of B: 

3) If B thinks that A won't cooperate, which action will give B a higher profit?

☐ Going it alone
☐ Joining forces with A
Imagine, you witness the following conversation:

B says to A:

“I would really like to join forces with you, but how can I be sure that you will cooperate with me rather than going it alone and taking all the profit for yourself?”

A responds:

“All I can say is that I plan to cooperate with you, though I can’t promise that I will do so.”

B listens carefully and decides to join forces with A.

A decides not to cooperate with B. Remember: A made no promise to cooperate with B. You observe this.

Imagine you can inflict a monetary punishment on A for not cooperating (e.g., by boycotting A’s business which results in a monetary loss for A). Inflicting this punishment, however, is not costless to you (boycotting a business that you have been buying from forces you to switch to another product requiring you to change your habits, pay more for the other product, consume a product you like less, etc...).
What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 3 knowing that A did not make a promise?

- [ ] Very Unlikely
- [ ] Unlikely
- [ ] Undecided
- [ ] Likely
- [ ] Very Likely
What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 0 knowing that A did not make a promise?

- Very Unlikely
- Unlikely
- Undecided
- Likely
- Very Likely
What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 6 knowing that A did not make a promise?

- Very Unlikely
- Unlikely
- Undecided
- Likely
- Very Likely
Imagine, you witness the following conversation:

B says to A

“I would really like to join forces with you, but how can I be sure that you will cooperate with me rather than going it alone and taking all the profit for yourself?”

A responds:

“I understand that you are worried I could take advantage of you, but I promise I will cooperate with you.”

B says:

“Okay, if you promise to cooperate with me, let’s work together.”

B subsequently decides to join forces with A.

A decides not to cooperate with B. Remember: A promised to cooperate with B. You observe this.

Imagine you have the power to inflict a punishment on A for breaking the promise to B (e.g., by boycotting A’s business which results in a monetary loss for A). Inflicting this punishment, however, is not costless to you (boycotting a business that you have been buying from forces you to switch to another product requiring you to change your habits, pay more for the other product, consume a product you like less, etc...).
What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 6 in reliance on A's promise?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Option</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Go back to display scenario instructions again

What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 3 in reliance on A's promise?

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Unlikely</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
Go back to display scenario instructions again

What is the likelihood you would choose to inflict the punishment on A if B has invested 0 in reliance on A's promise?

- Very Unlikely
- Unlikely
- Undecided
- Likely
- Very Likely

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Did you understand how A's and B's actions affect their profits?

- Yes
- No
- Kind of

Finally, please answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I didn't take the scenario seriously. I just wanted to earn the $1.50 fee as quickly as possible</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I carefully read the instructions.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I chose my answers in order to make myself seem like a good person.</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is the first time I have completed this survey.</td>
<td>○</td>
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</table>
Please provide some demographical information.

What is your age?

What is your gender?
- Female
- Male

Is English your first language?
- Yes
- No

What is your highest level of schooling?
- Master's, doctoral, or professional degree such as medicine or law
- Bachelor's degree
- Associate's degree
- Vocational or technical certificate / diploma after high school (such as cosmetics)
- High school diploma
- I did not complete high school

Are you an mTurk Master Worker (your response to this questions will have no effect on your payout)?
- Yes
- No
- I do not know what an mTurk Master Worker is.
Thank you for participating in the survey.

Here is your MTurk Code: 752796

To receive payment for participating, click “Accept HIT” in the Mechanical Turk window, enter this code, and then click “Submit”.